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LEFT OUT 
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
What happened to the progressive position on criminal law?  There was a 
time when criminal justice issues were at the core of the left’s agenda.  Yet at a 
moment when approximately two million Americans are behind bars,1 when the 
right to habeas corpus has been decimated,2 when racial profiling has again be-
come acceptable policy,3 and when protections against government surveillance 
and coerced confessions are collapsing,4 progressives have lost their voice on 
matters of criminal justice.  To make double use of a bad pun, one can fairly 
ask: What is left to talk about when the issue is crime and punishment? 
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 1. Paige M. Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear (2002), at  
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjimO2.pdf (last visited June 6, 2003) (2,019,234 incarcerated in 
nation’s jails and prisons in 2002). 
 2. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (providing that 
habeas corpus is unavailable on behalf of a state prisoner when the claim has been adjudicated on the 
merits in state court, unless the decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or resulted from a decision that was 
based upon an unreasonable determination of fact.) 
 3. See, e.g., JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 168 
(2002) (citing polling data showing that approximately eighty percent of Americans rejected racial pro-
filing before the World Trade Center attack, but sixty percent favored racial profiling after the attack); 
Samuel Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1414 
(2002) (noting that support for racial profiling has emerged across the political spectrum after the 
World Trade Center attack); cf. Eric Lichtblaeu, Bush Issues Racial Profiling Ban But Exempts Security 
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at A1 (reporting that federal policy bans the use of race and eth-
nicity for ordinary investigations but permits its use for investigations involving national security and 
border integrity). 
 4. See U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-565, § 203(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (permitting 
the sharing of information from national security wiretaps); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. For-
eign Int. Surv. Ct. of Rev. 2002) (holding the government need not demonstrate that the primary pur-
pose of electronic surveillance was not criminal prosecution when it secures permission for a national 
security wiretap); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 
‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facility, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 26, 2002, at A1 (“While the U.S. government publicly denounces the use of torture, each of the 
current national security officials interviewed for this article defended the use of violence against cap-
tives as just and necessary. . . . ‘If you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you 
probably aren’t doing your job,’ said one official who has supervised the capture and transfer of ac-
cused terrorists.”). 
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There are plenty of external explanations for the left’s collapse.  Whether 
because of bad luck or bad policies, it is simply a fact that Warren Court re-
forms coincided with a huge rise in crime rates—a rise that served to discredit 
the left’s position.5  An important ingredient in Bill Clinton’s success in delaying 
the long-term secular decline of the Democratic party was his ability to con-
vince the public that Democrats, too, could be tough on crime.6  When the crime 
rate finally began to moderate,7 there was again, for a brief moment, political 
space to discuss issues like capital punishment and overincarceration.  Then 
came 9/11, and, as the cliché has it, everything changed.8 
In this essay, I do not want to dwell on these external explanations, as pow-
erful as they are.  Instead, my thesis is that the left’s problem regarding criminal 
justice is at least partially of its own making.  Specifically, the problem stems 
from deep contradictions in the left’s positions.  Progressives have not one posi-
tion on crime, but at least seven different ones, and these positions cannot be 
reconciled.  Most of this essay consists of a taxonomy of conflicting progressive 
views on criminal justice.  Before I begin, however, I need to qualify my thesis 
in three important ways. 
First, as will become obvious, what I present below amounts to no more 
than brief descriptions—really evocations—of attitudes, arguments, and predis-
positions, rather than anything like the detailed analysis that these positions de-
serve.  My purpose is not to offer a full defense or critique of the views I de-
scribe, but to demonstrate the ambivalence and contradiction that are hallmarks 
of leftist and liberal analysis of crime and punishment. 
Second, crime is not only an academic preoccupation; it is also a subject of 
political debate.  It is important, therefore, to distinguish between what might 
loosely be labeled highbrow positions and low- or middlebrow positions on 
criminal justice.  In much of this essay, I will be discussing highbrow positions; 
at the end, I will turn briefly to low- and middlebrow views. 
Finally, because I will present this taxonomy as if I were an outsider, it is 
important to make clear at the outset that I consider myself a criminal justice 
 
 5. In 1960 there were 286,220 violent crimes in the United States.  By 1968, the number of violent 
crimes had reached 590,640. Federal Bureau of Investigation, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 59 (1973). 
 6. Paul J. Quirk & Joseph Hinchliffe, Domestic Policy: The Trials of a Centrist Democrat, in THE 
CLINTON PRESIDENCY: FIRST APPRAISALS 262, 277-79 (Colin Campbell & Bert A. Rockman eds., 
1996) (“Clinton staked out a centrist position on crime.”); Ann Devroy & Rene Sanchez, Clinton Calls 
for New Ban on ‘Cop-Killer’ Bullets; During Chicago Speech and in Campaign Ads, President Reiterates 
Anti-Crime Message, WASH. POST, July 1, 1995, at A7 (reporting polling data showing that “[a]fter 
years in which a large margin of the public generally considered Democrats weak on [crime] the two 
parties now are virtually even”); Dennis Shea, Clinton and the GOP Options; Winning Back Reagan 
Democrats, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1993, at A13 (noting that in 1992, “the Bush campaign ceded the 
crime issue to Clinton, even though a tough-on-crime stance had been one of the key reasons for Bush’s 
success in 1988.”). 
 7. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of violent crimes fell from 1,926,017 to 1,424,289. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 66 (2000). 
 8. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2138 (2002) (stating that 
“even before the fires in the rubble that was the World Trade Center burned themselves out, some 
politicians were calling for broader powers for law enforcement and greater restrictions on citizens.”). 
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progressive.  The confusion I present here is, therefore, my own confusion, and 
the map I outline plots my own uncertainty. 
II 
A TAXONOMY OF POSITIONS 
A. The Scientistic Model 
Perhaps the earliest identifiable left position on criminal law was associated 
with the broader progressive movement in the first third of the last century.  An 
important part of early twentieth century progressivism associated progress 
with a rational, scientific approach to social problems.9  Scientism as applied to 
criminal law rejected regressive ideas like freedom of the will, retribution, and 
blame.  Instead, crime was a social problem subject to causal explanations and 
rational solutions.10  Implications for criminal law policy, never fully embraced 
by progressive scholars, included changing underlying social conditions that 
produced crime and turning criminals over to experts.  These experts, in turn, 
were likely to advocate abandonment of blame, of the mens rea requirement for 
crime, and of punishment proportional to moral guilt.  Instead, they recom-
mended a regime of indeterminate sentencing, with treatment provided for 
those capable of rehabilitation, and indefinite but humane incarceration for in-
corrigibles.11 
The scientistic model had an important influence on the left’s effort to 
medicalize crime—most closely associated with David Bazelon and the D.C. 
Circuit—in the middle decades of the last century.12  Today, it survives in the so-
ciology of crime on the left13 and, in ideologically transmuted form, in the law 
and economics approaches to deterrence theory and criminal justice.14  The sci-
entistic model is closely allied with, but not identical to 
 
 9. See HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: 1898-1914, at 244-47 (1971). 
 10. See, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 50-59 (2002); Thomas Green, Freedom and Responsibility 
in the Age of Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1919-20 (1995).  For an in-
fluential post Progressive-era statement of these views, see KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF 
PUNISHMENT (1968). 
 11. See, e.g., ALEXANDER W. PISCIOTTA, BENEVOLENT REPRESSION: SOCIAL CONTROL AND 
THE AMERICAN REFORMATORY-PRISON MOVEMENT 104-05 (1994); ROTHMAN, supra note 10, at 52-
59; Green, supra note 10, at 1950.  Perhaps the most influential statement of this view came after the 
Progressive period.  See  BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963); BARBARA 
WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1959). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Alexander 471 F.2d 923, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, 
J., dissenting); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); David Bazelon, The Morality of 
the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976). 
 13. See, e.g., Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency, in 
THE CRIMINOLOGY THEORY READER 177, 177-94 (Stuart Henry & Werner Einstadter eds., 1998). 
 14. The seminal works are Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON 169 (1968), and George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 
526 (1970).  See generally THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME (Ralph Andreano & John J. Siegfried eds., 
1980). 
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B.  The Anti-Lochnerian Model  
Progressive attacks on the regime of Lochner v. New York15 included impor-
tant critiques of the notion of unmediated freedom located in a private sphere.  
Some legal realists attacked the very idea of a private sphere, arguing that it was 
always constructed by public government choice, and that supposed freedom in 
this sphere amounted to nothing more than a government license for coercion 
by market actors.16  Advocates of the progressive critique of right constitutional-
ism eventually gained control of the Supreme Court, and this victory is cap-
tured, symbolically if not quite chronologically, by Justice Stone’s effort to 
teach us what might be called the “lesson of the cedars and the apples.”  In 
Miller v. Schoene,17 the Court was confronted with a Virginia statute that or-
dered the destruction of cedar trees when they were located near apple trees 
because cedar rust, harmless to the host cedar trees, is fatal to apple trees.18  Jus-
tice Stone rejected the argument that the statute constituted an uncompensated 
taking of property.19 Conceding that the statute led to government destruction 
of the cedars, he pointed out that a government decision to do nothing was 
“none the less a choice”20 which would lead to the destruction of the apples. 
The lesson of the cedars and apples has obvious implications for criminal 
justice issues: It makes talk about the rights of criminal defendants incoherent.  
Recognizing the rights of criminal defendants violates the rights of criminal vic-
tims, just as protecting the cedars leads to the destruction of the apples.  Leav-
ing the victims of crime unprotected is “none the less a choice” for which gov-
ernment also bears responsibility.  Thus, instead of involving rights on one side 
and mere policies on the other, criminal justice issues require a choice between 
rights. 
There are some traces of this analytic insight in what there is of a Critical 
Legal Studies perspective on criminal law.21  However, most leftists who think 
about criminal law have failed to assimilate the “law and order” implications 
that the insight holds.  Although liberals and leftists have appreciated these im-
plications regarding a few specialized criminal justice problems like the failure 
of government to control child abuse, rape, hate crimes, and domestic violence,22 
 
 15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 16. The most well-known statement of this view is Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
 17. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
 18. Id. at 279. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591 (1981); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical 
Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2231 (1993).  For my contribution to this literature, see Louis Mi-
chael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the Regula-
tory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1996). 
 22. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, 
AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999) (child abuse); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (rape); 
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, in WORDS THAT 
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47, 47-50 
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anti-Lochnerism has not produced a generalized leftist argument for crime con-
trol. This failure is partially caused by the fact that, at the very moment that the 
Anti-Lochner model seemed to be at the height of its power, it was overtaken 
by 
C.  The Civil Liberties Model  
The civil liberties model is fundamentally inconsistent with anti-Lochnerism.  
It is not coincidental that George Sutherland, the author of Powell v. Alabama,23 
the first Supreme Court decision invalidating a state criminal conviction on due 
process grounds, was also one of the “Four Horsemen of Reaction”24 who de-
fended Lochner to the bitter end.  As William Stuntz has brilliantly demon-
strated, most building blocks of the civil liberties model derive from Lochner-
era conceptions of prepolitical property rights.25  Nonetheless, beginning in the 
1930s, and picking up momentum throughout the 1950s and 1960s, progressives 
abandoned scientism and anti-Lochnerism for the civil liberties position.26  This 
model crucially depends on the distinction between the government acting and 
letting happen, the very distinction undermined by the lesson of the cedars and 
the apples.  It privileges the exercise of rights in the private sphere and con-
demns government action that infringes upon those rights.  Why did progres-
sives who cut their teeth on anti-Lochnerism buy into a set of views fundamen-
tally inconsistent with their own critique of Lochner?  The shift was almost 
certainly overdetermined,27 but one large reason was because of the emergence 
of 
D.  The Civil Rights Model 
Properly speaking, this is not really a model, but a set of motivations or pre-
dispositions.  Since the Civil War, the criminal justice system has served as a 
 
(1993)  (hate speech); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2151, 2158 (1994) (domestic violence). 
 23. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 24. FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 – 
1955, at 217 (1955). 
 25. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 395 
(1995) (“Fourth and Fifth Amendment history thus has more in common with the First Amendment 
and Lochner v. New York than with criminal procedure as we know it today.”). 
 26. The movement was led in the academy by the tireless efforts of Yale Kamisar.  See, e.g., Yale 
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the “New” Fifth Amendment and 
the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966); Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the 
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on “ the Most Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1962).  See generally YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW 
AND POLICY (1980). For an early and influential summary and evaluation, see Herbert L. Packer, Two 
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
 27. For example, in addition to the explanations I emphasize here, the shift was related to in-
creased concern about poverty and to still salient revulsion against Nazi and Fascist practices in 
Europe.  Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 62-63 (1996). 
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crucial adjunct to the systematic subjugation of African Americans.28  It is not 
surprising, then, that when the civil rights movement began to gain ground, its 
proponents turned their attention to criminal justice issues.  Thus the landmark 
case of Powell v. Alabama,29 involving the notorious framing of black teenagers 
for the supposed rape of two white women, served as an important organizing 
tool for civil rights activists.  For decades, the futile struggle to pass anti-
lynching legislation in Congress was at the center of the civil rights agenda.30  
The struggle against the third degree largely centered on race, symbolized by 
Brown v. Mississippi,31 the first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a 
state confession. As Chief Justice Hughes reported in his opinion for the Court, 
when the arresting officer was asked whether he had beaten Brown, he unself-
consciously replied, “not too much for a negro; not as much as I would have 
done if it were left to me.”32 
Today, lynching has pretty much ended,33 and use of the third degree is 
much less frequent,34 but the link between criminal justice and race remains po-
litically important, as the controversy of racial profiling and the continuing 
gross disproportion in arrest and incarceration rates for African Americans il-
lustrate.  Controversies surrounding these issues can still make criminal defense 
work seem like part of the fight for racial liberation.35  But this view has lost 
force as the country has turned away from preoccupation with race.  Moreover, 
it is in obvious tension with the lessons of the cedars and the apples.  Minorities 
are disproportionately victimized not just by the criminal justice system, but 
also by crime (a point that the anti-Lochner model brings to the fore).36  And to 
some degree, the specifically racial focus of the civil rights model has been di-
luted by 
 
 28. See, e.g., KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, 
BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 14-25 (1998). 
 29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 30. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 
59-61 (2000). 
 31. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 32. Id. at 284.  On the association between the civil rights revolution and the emergence of criminal 
procedure protections, see Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Mi-
norities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305-06 (1982); see Klarman, supra note 27. 
 33. But see James Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; 2 are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1998, at A-9 (reporting assault of Matthew Shepard , an openly gay student who was beaten and tied to 
a fence for eighteen hours in Laramie, Wyoming); Trial of Three Men to Begin Today in Lubbock Hate-
Crime Rampage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 6, 1995, at 7A (reporting race-based attack on three 
men in Lubbock, Texas). 
 34. But see supra note 4. 
 35. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). 
 36. For an argument along these lines, see Randall Kennedy, Changing Images of the State: The 
State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1994) (“Like many so-
cial ills, crime afflicts African-Americans with a special vengeance . . . .  Many of those who seek to 
champion the interests of African-Americans, however, wrongly retard efforts to control criminality.”); 
see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (“[T]he principal injury suffered 
by African-Americans in relation to criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of 
the laws.”). 
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E.  The Human Dignity Model 
According to this view, the government owes a duty of concern and respect 
to all of its citizens, including the least advantaged.  The association between 
crime and economic and racial subservience makes our treatment of criminals a 
kind of test case for government concern for the underprivileged.37  This model 
is clearly in tension with scientism and anti-Lochnerism.  It is difficult to recon-
cile a human dignity concept with a deterministic model of human behavior like 
scientism that treats human beings as the playthings of genes and the environ-
ment.  Similarly, adherents to the anti-Lochnerian model are bound to ask, 
“What about the human dignity of the victims of crime?”  What may be less ob-
vious is that the human dignity model is also in some tension with the civil liber-
ties and civil rights models.  To be sure, an aspect of the protection of human 
dignity is fair procedures.  But treating criminal suspects as full human beings 
also requires treating them as morally responsible agents.38  This realization led 
to the development of a kind of left retributivism beginning in the 1970s.39  Ac-
cording to this perspective, following Kant, one can see harsh sentences as 
something to which criminal defendants have a right.40 Punishment is actually a 
recognition of the humanity of defendants.  Similarly, a turning away from re-
habilitative theories morphs into respect for human freedom and mental integ-
rity by treating criminals as capable of choice.  But left retributivism is in sharp 
conflict with 
F.  The Romantic Model 
This model is not much discussed any more, but it animates some left reac-
tion to the criminal justice system.  At least, it animates my own reaction.  The 
image plays off the left’s historic hatred of authority and attraction to unmedi-
ated freedom.  This model suggests that the criminal is a romantic outlaw, un-
constrained by bourgeois inhibition and fighting against an unjust social order.41  
It is captured perfectly by the old Woody Guthrie song, “Pretty Boy Floyd”: 
 
 
 
 
 37. For my own defense of this model, see Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Prema-
ture?) Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2324-26 (1998)(book review). 
 38. Perhaps the leading twentieth century proponent of this view was Herbert Morris.  See Herbert 
Morris, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31, 31-63 (1976) (arguing that human beings have a right to be punished). 
 39. See, e.g., Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments: Report of the Com-
mittee  for the Study of Incarceration (1976).  For a modern restatement, see Paul Butler, Retribution, 
for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1873 (1999). 
 40. The canonical statement of this position is IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 
(W. Hastie trans. Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1797) (“The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and 
woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that 
may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it.”). 
 41. See, e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, SAINT GENET: ACTOR AND MARTYR 652-53 (Bernard Frecht-
man trans., George Braziller, Inc. 1963) (1952). 
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Now as through this world I ramble, 
I see lots of funny men, 
Some will rob you with a six-gun 
And some with a fountain pen. 
But as through this life you travel, 
And as through your life you roam 
You won’t never see an outlaw 
Drive a family from their home.42 
 
 
It is not easy to reconcile the lives that many real criminals actually lead 
with these romantic notions,43 but the stance nonetheless captures the left’s ha-
tred of a deeply inegalitarian social order.  It is made marginally more plausible 
by quasi- or pseudo-Marxist accounts of the system,44 which treat any punish-
ment of criminals as unjust under current social conditions.  Unfortunately, 
however, the romantic model once again produces tensions and contradictions. 
Left anti-statism is in tension with the anti-Lochnerian view, which treats the 
state as the principal engine for redistribution and the opponent of market 
power.  Similarly, Marxist accounts, to the extent they are deterministic, run up 
against the human dignity model.  The urge to reconcile human dignity, deter-
minism, and anti-statism helps explain the attraction of the final stance, 
G. The Contingent Fate Model 
 Here, the relevant folk artist is Phil Oches: 
 
Show me the prison 
Show me the jail 
Show me the prisoner whose life has gone stale. 
And I’ll show you a young man 
With so many reasons why 
And there but for fortune 
Go you or I45 
 
 
 42. Woody Guthrie, Pretty Boy Floyd, on BUFFALO SKINNERS (Smithsonian Folkways 1999). 
 43. As my friend, Stephen Morse, has pointed out to me, some “outlaws”—the ones described by 
TRUMAN CAPOTE in IN COLD BLOOD (1965), for example—do not “drive a family from its home,” be-
cause they murder the family in its home. 
 44. For a sophisticated Marxist account that is neither quasi- nor pseudo-, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973). 
 45. Phil Oches, There But for Fortune, PHIL OCHES IN CONCERT (Rhino Records 1966). Perhaps it 
says something important that all the cultural references here are hopelessly dated.  My wife and kids 
regularly tell me that I live under a rock. But just to show that I am not entirely out of step with modern 
culture, I suppose I should say that a modern updating of this view is contained in Steve Earle’s John 
Walker’s Blues on JERUSALEM (Artemis Records 2002).  I’m thankful to Mark Tushnet (who does not 
live under a rock) for this suggestion. 
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I must confess a special weakness for this model.  When I think back on my 
brief career as a public defender, the thing that most surprised me then, and 
continues to haunt me now, is how similar many of my clients were to me and 
my friends.  Despite differences in race, class, education, and religion, they 
turned out not to be “other” in the way that I had expected.46  Many of them 
were smart, funny, friendly, and interesting.  They were just in a different line of 
work.  For me, at least, the left is most admirable and least tendentious when it 
is most empathic and least judgmental.  The contingent fate model manages to 
combine the deterministic insight that we have not chosen our fate with the 
humanistic insight that life’s losers deserve our sympathy rather than our con-
demnation.  It is easy to see why the model is attractive. 
It would be expecting too much, though, to suppose that this model can es-
cape the contradictions that bedevil all the others. To begin with, there is a fine 
line between empathy and condescension.  Empathy, like its companion virtue, 
mercy, often arises in contexts of power imbalance.  Empathy identifies with its 
target, but paradoxically, also subtly devalues it. If fortune has nothing to do 
with choice, then there is no reason to respect or care about the choices that the 
unfortunate have made. Thus, the contingent fate model risks running up 
against the human dignity model. 
Moreover, if fate is really contingent, then one has to imagine oneself not 
just as a criminal, but also as a victim, a prosecutor, a judge, or (heaven forfend) 
a right-winger.  Some of these people turn out to be smart, funny, friendly, and 
interesting, too.  Empathy, once loosed, is not easily cabined.  The upshot is a 
dilution of the indignation that fuels each of the other six models. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
So what in the end is left to say about crime and justice?  The answer is, I 
am afraid, not much.  Riven by contradiction and confusion, the left can hardly 
be surprised when its views are disparaged and parodied, despised and ignored.  
Still, there is one thing to say in defense of the left, and, come to think of it, this 
one thing is pretty important: The left is not the right.  When contrasted with 
the right, the left’s moral confusion begins to seem like a virtue. 
When the left’s highbrow position gets transmuted into low- and middle-
brow politics, the result is a kind of paralysis.  If one believes, as I do, that the 
biggest risk in the criminal law is the slide toward barbarism, then paralysis is 
not such a bad state of affairs.  To the extent that criminal law is about the im-
position of pain on other human beings, a taste for moral ambiguity can serve as 
an important brake on the natural tendency toward rage and sadism. 
 
 46. Some of the literature that best captures this destabilizing reality has been produced by my col-
league, Abbe Smith.  See Abbe Smith, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443 
(1999); Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do 
Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925 (2000); Abbe Smith, Rosie O’Neill Goes to Law School: The 
Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C. R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
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Unfortunately, though, we do not live in an age when moral ambiguity is 
much valued,  and, for this reason as well, the left has little current influence on 
criminal justice policy.  Still, those of us on the left can be proud that our high-
brow positions do not get transmuted by popular culture into worse evils: mind-
less and heartless lashing out against people with the least social power,  sim-
plistic and hypocritical moralizing, barely disguised racism, pandering to fear 
and intolerance, and the cynical manipulation of public opinion to achieve sor-
did ends.  True, there’s not much left of the left, but neither is there much right 
about the right. 
